In this paper, I study the determinants of credit spread changes of individual U.S. dollar denominated bonds -domestic and foreign sovereign -using fundamentals specified by structural models. Credit spreads are important determinants of the cost of debt for all issuers and are fully determined by credit risk in structural models. I construct a new dataset of domestic corporate and sovereign U.S. dollar bonds, which I use to find that changes in spreads not explained by fundamentals have two large common components that are distinct for each type of debt I study. Using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model, I find that domestic spreads are related to the lagged first component of sovereign spreads. Consequently, even though there is no contemporaneous common component in bond spreads, there seems to be a common component when focusing on the dynamics of these spreads. Traditional macro liquidity variables are related to the common components found in domestic and sovereign spread changes. My findings suggest possible explanations for the common component documented by previous research in domestic debt spreads. My research shows that, after taking into account the dynamics of the common components in credit spreads across debt types, the cost of debt for firms and countries depends to some extent on shocks that affect all types of debt.
1.
Introduction.
In this paper I analyze the determinants of credit spread changes of individual U.S domestic and sovereign bonds. Previous research has focused on one type of bonds at a time, making this paper the first one to bring together the credit spreads on these two types of debt to study their joint dynamics. If the market for dollar-denominated creditrisky bonds is integrated, the information present in the time series cross-section of the unexplained portion of U.S. dollar sovereign debt spread changes should be related to the common component unrelated to credit risk identified by previous research in spread changes of U.S. domestic bonds (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin, 2001; Huang and Huang, 2003) . This should especially be the case if that common component can be explained by liquidity shocks, since such shocks are pervasive across markets (Chen, Lesmond, and Wei, 2002; Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam, 2003; Kamara, 1994) . In this paper, I investigate whether common factors that explain credit spread changes for domestic and sovereign debt after taking into account fundamentals are related and analyze the determinants of these common factors.
Existing research investigates separately the existence of common components in changes in credit spreads for domestic credit-risky debt and dollar-denominated sovereign debt. Scherer and Avellaneda (2000) identify the existence of two common factors for sovereign debt spread changes. Westphalen (2003) finds evidence of a common factor for sovereign debt spread changes of bonds denominated in several currencies after controlling for country risk proxies. Research on changes in domestic bond credit spreads by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) finds one common component after controlling for fundamentals. The relation between these common components has not been examined in the literature.
I extend the research on common components present in bond spreads by examining whether the information in the dynamics of U.S. dollar denominated sovereign debt spreads is associated with the common component found in U.S. corporate bond spreads. Specifically, I estimate different models of spread changes for each type of bonds -domestic and sovereign -because these two groups vary in their source of credit risk. Using principal component analysis for each debt type, I extract common factors from the unexplained portion of credit spread changes from these models. I investigate whether the common factors in U.S. dollar denominated sovereign debt are related to the common factors present in U.S. corporate debt spread changes using both regressions explaining contemporaneous changes in spreads and a dynamic model of changes in spreads. Finally, I attempt to provide an economic interpretation for the relations I uncover.
To conduct this analysis, I construct a new dataset that is comprised of all domestic industrial and U.S. dollar-denominated sovereign debt. This dataset contains data for 233 non-callable, non-puttable bonds issued by 37 emerging countries and 3097 domestic corporate bonds issued by 649 different companies that traded between January 1990 and January 2003. This dataset is different from the ones used by earlier studies in at least three ways. First, other bond studies that use Datastream bond data do not include 'dead' issues, i.e., bonds that have matured or were retired, while I include them to avoid a survivorship bias. Second, the Fixed Income Database used in some other studies has a limited coverage of high-yield issues since it mainly covers investment-grade bonds (Huang and Kong, 2003) . I do not have that problem since my dataset contains data for the complete universe of bonds covered by Datastream. Finally, this dataset covers a longer time period than any previous study.
My results help to discriminate between competing explanations for the common component previously documented for domestic debt, and also might suggest new explanations. I find strong evidence of the existence of two common factors unrelated to credit risk in debt spread changes of U.S. denominated sovereign debt and in the debt spread changes of domestic bonds. While principal component analysis shows no evidence of contemporaneous correlation between the two domestic and the two sovereign factors, a vector autoregressive (VAR) model shows that domestic spread changes are related to the lagged sovereign spread first common component. Finally, I
find that all four common factors are related to the flows of money going into equity and bond funds, as measured by the Investment Company Institute (ICI), while only the second common component of each group is related to a macroeconomic measure of liquidity, namely the net borrowed reserves form the Federal Reserve.
This paper is the first the one to bring together these two types of credit-risky dollar-denominated debt to study the joint dynamics of the common factors in their credit spreads. The results I obtain improve our understanding of the determinants of the cost of debt for foreign countries and for domestic firms. For example, my results suggest that the cost of debt for foreign countries and domestic firms is not only a function of their own creditworthiness but also depends on shocks that affect the price of all debt. Further, the results help us understand better the extent to which the sovereign and domestic corporate bond markets are integrated. In a fully integrated dollar debt market, we would expect the relation between domestic corporate credit spreads and sovereign credit spreads to be contemporaneous. Further research should investigate whether the lack of a contemporaneous relation is due to differences in liquidity and infrequent trading or if this reflects a market inefficiency. The lack of a relation between the common components of domestic corporate credit spread changes and sovereign credit spread changes suggests that the cost of debt for emerging markets depends mostly on country and emerging-market specific considerations. This is surprising in light of a considerable literature that emphasizes the impact of developed country developments for capital flows into emerging markets (Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart, 1993; Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi, 1998) . Further investigation of the robustness of my results might shed greater insight into this issue.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the literature, sample, variables and methodology used to model credit spread changes for sovereign bonds.
Section III does the same for credit spread changes for domestic corporate bonds. I investigate, using a variety of techniques, the existence and nature of the factors affecting debt spread changes in section IV. Section V analyzes the dynamics of the common factors and investigates whether liquidity and/or demand related variables are related to them. Section VI concludes.
2.
Debt spreads of sovereign bonds.
In order to examine whether a common factor is associated with the variation in U.S. domestic corporate and U.S. dollar denominated sovereign spreads, the unexplained variation in each spread (i.e. residuals) must be calculated. My choice of variables to compute the credit risk portion of debt spread changes is based on the determinants of bond spread changes specified by structural models. For sovereign bond spreads, I expect bond-specific characteristics to be associated with bond spreads. Additionally, I expect bond spreads to be related to macro or country-specific factors as well as systematic factors. In this section, I review the relevant literature on U.S. dollar denominated sovereign bond spreads (section 2.1), and then discuss the testable implications of the extant literature and describe the proxies that are used to test the hypotheses derived from it (section 2.2). I describe the sovereign bond sample next (section 2.3), present a model to estimate debt spreads, discuss the results, and explain the computation of residuals (section 2.4).
Sovereign debt literature.
The international debt market changed dramatically in the past 25 years. In the 1980s bank loans were the principal instrument of this market. By the end of that decade, reckless lending and borrowing caused outstanding debt balances to skyrocket to unsustainable levels. The crushing pressure of debt payments forced several emerging market countries to the verge of default. To avoid the devastating ripple effects of such a default on the world's financial system -which was still recovering from the 1987 stock market crash--the U.S. government helped put in place a plan that would allow these countries to orderly restructure their debt schedule. The Brady plan, formulated in 1989
by then Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady in association with the World Bank and IMF, called for the issuance of sovereign bonds to replace the loans of commercial banks. 1 Brady bonds opened a vast and untapped market for emerging market countries hungry for U.S. dollars to help finance their growth, commercial deficits or simply to cover current expenses. Bank loans, while still an important component in sovereign debt balances, gave way to sovereign bonds as the principal financing instrument for emerging countries in the 1990s. Bonds were clearly preferred for several reasons, for instance the dispersion of creditors and the existence of a market where these bonds could be actively traded, which provided investors with a transparent benchmark measure of country risk.
The sovereign spread, or credit spread, computed now from bond yields, continued to be such benchmark measure of country risk.
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Starting in the 1980s, the cross-section of sovereign debt spreads has been studied by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) , where governments trade off the cost of paying debt versus reputation costs or exclusion from capital markets, and Bulow and Rogoff (1989) , who provide rational explanations for international lending and model the costs of debt repudiation as direct sanctions. Edwards (1984) analyzed the macroeconomic determinants of the debt spread measured as the difference between the interest rate charged to a particular country and LIBOR (London InterBank Offered Rate).
Hernández-Trillo (1995) uses a measure openness, unexpected shocks to GDP, international reserves and the risk free rate to explain the probability of default in sovereign loans. The international episodes of financial contagion experimented in the second half of the 1990s attracted even more attention to this area, as researchers started 1 These bonds were coupon bearing (fixed, floating or hybrid), long maturity (ten to thirty years) issued in registered or bearer form, whose principal and part of the interest were guaranteed by collateral of U.S. Treasury bonds and other high grade securities. Some of them included special recovery rights (warrants) that could be detached and traded separately. This last characteristic made the computations of yields for these bonds especially tricky. 2 The credit spread is often referred to as yield spread, debt spread or simply spread. These terms are used interchangeably in this paper.
to devote more time to the study of periods of increased co-movements among international financial markets. For instance, Cantor and Packer (1996) and Eichengreen and Moody (1998) study the determinants of bond spreads at the issue level, finding that agency ratings include most of the information existing in macroeconomic variables.
More recently, Scherer and Avellaneda (2000), Joutz and Maxwell (2002) and Cifarelli and Paladino (2002) study selected series from several emerging markets using principal component analysis and vector-autoregressions.
As mentioned before, in this paper I take a structural approach to the modeling of debt spreads. It is important to mention, though, that sovereign debt is different from corporate debt. One of the most important characteristics of any debt contract is the guarantee provided by the legal framework to creditors that allows them, in the case of default, to take possession of collateral and/or to liquidate the defaulting debtor's assets.
There is no enforceable bankruptcy code for sovereign bonds, making it effectively impossible for a creditor to claim a defaulting country's assets. Acknowledging the endogenous default decision that countries face in this framework, Gibson and Sundaresan (1999) So far, research on sovereign debt spreads has focused more on the issue level determination process than in the study of dynamics of the cross-section. There are two reasons for this. First, thin trading in many of these bonds produces relatively fewer sovereign bond transactions data. As a result, some data vendors resort to provide matrix prices (e.g. Bloomberg), which are not useful for research purposes. 4 Second, in the early 1990s, when the market for sovereign debt was in its infancy, countries started by issuing few bonds. As their credibility improved, reinforced by the implementation of structural reforms in their economies, and investors got acquainted with this new supply of bonds, sovereign issuers increased the number and amount of debt offerings. Therefore, it took some years for this market to be sufficiently diverse and liquid enough to allow the construction of a data panel suitable for research purposes.
Implications of the literature and proxies used to test them.
Structural models of sovereign debt have identified macroeconomic variables that affect sovereign debt spreads. 5 Based in part on previous literature, I put together three lists of variables that should capture most of the debt spread variation. The first list contains bond-specific variables, i.e., variables that vary within bond issues, e.g. years to maturity. The second list contains variables that vary from country to country but are the same for all bonds from a given country (country-specific variables). The third list structure and discount Brady bond prices to a reduced-form model using a two factor affine-yield model. Duffie, Pedersen and Singleton (2003) conduct an analysis of Russian debt. 4 Actual quotes and/or transaction prices are available from different providers in the Bloomberg terminal through an additional subscription service. 5 One problem with most empirical work exploring the relation between macroeconomic variables and debt spreads is that they conduct static analysis, i.e., only study the cross-section of spreads at one point in time, usually at issuance. For instance, GDP growth has been theoretically and empirically shown to have significant explanatory power over issue level spreads. This is not useful in this context since most of the data used in this paper is released monthly, quarterly or even annually in some countries.
contains variables that are the same for all bonds in the sovereign sample, and try to capture changes in the U.S. interest rate term structure.
Bond-specific variables.
The bond-specific variable used is years to maturity. By definition, a bond's life to maturity duration measures how long an investor has to wait before getting their money back. Sovereign bonds pay (relatively) large coupons and therefore a large proportion of the cash flows are paid throughout the life of these bonds, thus we have to consider the possibility that years to maturity could be an overstated proxy of a bond's average life.
Country-specific variables.
These variables are chosen to capture a measure of a country's distance-todefault, i.e., a country's ability (and/or willingness, depending on the model of reference)
to keep servicing its debt. Following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) , Bulow and Rogoff (1989) , Krugman (1985 Krugman ( , 1989 , Gibson and Sundaresan (1999) and Westphalen (2002) , I
collect data on exports and total debt outstanding to construct a debt-to-exports ratio. To get a measure of monthly local wealth volatility, I use an equity volatility measure as proxy. Ideally, I wanted to use MSCI country indices, since they are calculated for each country using the same methodology. However, MSCI country 11 The use of CMT yields for those maturities did not affect our results at all. 12 All figures are expressed in current U.S. dollars. 13 The overall risk rating is measured on a scale from 1 to 100 where 1 denotes the least risk and 100 the most risk possible. A that all groups display high degree of non-normality. Also, as expected, spreads increase as we move down in ratings. The mean debt spread in the overall sample is 483 basis points, the maximum spread is 3939 basis points and the minimum is 1.9 basis points. Interestingly, the standard deviation also increases as the rating deteriorates. Over the sample period, the standard deviation is on the order of 25.3 to 809 basis points.
There is evidence of extreme movements in each group as the 90% and 10% values are away from the mean by several times the standard deviation.
Panel B has the mean values, by group and for the overall sample, of some country specific variables. Debt-to-reserves, debt-to-exports and political risk all increase in value as move down in rating to signal a worsening of a country's situation. I expect these variables to have on average higher values as we move form high to low ratings, and that is precisely what I find.
A model for sovereign spreads.
I estimate the following equation for each bond observation in the sample: Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (1) in four different rating groups. These groups are similar to those presented in table 2, except that the first and second groups from that table were grouped together in table 3.
The model seems to have a good fit, as measured by R-squared measures, which range from 19% to 30%. For brevity, I will discuss only the results for the overall sample.
The debt-to-reserves ratio and the political risk measure both have a positive coefficient 14 Some previous research has been conducted on spread levels, for instance, Houweling et. al. (2002) . Cantor and Packer (1996) and Eichengreen and Moody (1998) run regressions on the log of the yield spread. 15 I did experiment with several other methodologies. I did estimate equation 1 using OLS fixed effects, grouping our sample by bond, by country, and by region. I did also estimate FGLS (Feasible Generalized Least Squares), OLS with panel corrected standard errors and OLS with Huber/White standard error correction. All methodologies produced quantitatively and qualitatively similar results; however results were more consistent using OLS coefficients with Newey-West adjusted errors. Results obtained with other methods are not reported in this paper and are available from the author.
(as expected) and are highly significant. Two lags of the political risk variable were included to account for the possibility of autocorrelation in this variable. These variables measure the ability to service debt and the overall political and economic environment of the issuer. An increase in political risk would signal higher instability and/or the possibility of expropriation and therefore should be associated with a higher spread. An increase in the debt-to-reserves ratio could be caused by an increase in the nominal debt amount or a decrease in international reserves, both of which should be associated with a higher spread. I also find that the coefficient estimates when using debt-to-exports in place of debt-to-reserves are not significant and have the wrong sign, so they are not reported.
The coefficient associated to the U.S. Treasury yield curve level is negative and highly significant. Previous work had obtained insignificant positive coefficients (Cline and Barnes, 1997; Min, 1998; and Kamin and Von Kleist, 1999) , and significant negative coefficients (Eichengreen and Mody, 1998) . One interpretation of these negative coefficients is that, as interest rates go up, low rated countries find it less convenient to issue debt. Also, most structural models predict a negative relation because higher interest rates increase the drift of the process followed by the firm's (in this case, country's) value. A higher firm (country) value should be associated with a smaller spread and hence the negative sign. The coefficient associated with the U.S. Treasury slope term is always positive and significant, however, this is unexpected. Following the expectations theory of interest rates, a positively sloped yield curve should signal higher future rates, which in turn should be associated with smaller spreads.
Local volatility is positive and highly significant, as expected. The local stock return has the expected (negative) sign and is also significant. The coefficient on changes of years to maturity is negative and not significant. I interpret this coefficient as evidence of the existence of a survivorship bias in which only relatively better countries make it to issue longer term debt, as explained by Helwege and Turner (1999) for the domestic case.
It may be the case that investors think that in the case of a default, short term maturities are more risky than long term maturities since countries will usually default first on issues with closer maturities, making short term issues riskier. The lack of consistent cross-default clauses in some countries allows them to default or re-schedule debt payments selectively. Finally, for a country facing financial difficulties, a longer time horizon will provide the necessary time and maneuvering room to enact reforms and measures that will allow the country to return to fiscal stability, effectively making longer term debt less risky.
3. Debt spreads of domestic bonds.
In this section, I review the relevant literature on U.S. dollar denominated domestic bond spreads (section 3.1). Then I discuss the variables used in the computation of domestic spreads (section 3.2), and I describe the characteristics of the domestic bond sample (section 3.3). I then proceed to estimate domestic debt spreads, discuss the results and compute residuals (section 3.4).
Domestic debt literature.
The first structural model of risky debt is by Merton (1974) . In this paper, Merton used an option pricing approach to include systematic and idiosyncratic risk in the calculation of the value of a put option on the firm's value. 16 In Merton's model a firm defaults on its debt when its assets are not enough to cover its outstanding obligations.
Default occurs when the firm's value crosses from above a given threshold. The initial model allowed for default only at maturity and was extended by Black and Cox (1976) to allow for earlier default. Another extension was introduced by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) by incorporating stochastic interest rates. Strategic default was introduced in models by Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella_Barral and Perraudin (1997) .
Modeling endogenous corporate default was introduced by Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) . As these models needed lots of abstraction to achieve tractability, it was not surprising when they proved to be difficult to implement and then almost always with disappointing results (see Eom, Helwege and Huang (2003) for a review of the problems and limitations faced by structural models).
This lack of results motivated some researchers to try another approach, using reduced-form models, or intensity-based models. These models ignore firm-specific fundamentals and do not explicitly model the processes followed by the firm's leverage and/or value. Reduced-form models assume an unpredictable default process governed by an exogenous hazard rate. For instance, Duffie and Singleton (1997) use a generic point process and Lando (1998) uses a Cox process. Through extensive calibration, reduced form models generally produced better results at explaining and forecasting yield spreads than structural models.
More recently, Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001) tried to explain corporate spreads using explanatory factors that included the probability of default, the loss given default, and the difference in tax regimes. Collin-Dufresne et. al. (2001) tried to explain changes in the credit risk portion of corporate spreads using data on spot rates, reference yield curve slope, firms leverage and volatility, estimates for jumps in the firm's value and a proxy for the general business climate. Both papers, the former being more of a reduced-form approach and the latter using a variables specified by a structural framework, find similar results in that their models left a large portion of the crosssectional time variation of spreads unexplained, and further, they find that a single common unknown factor could explain up to 75% of the residual variation. Huang and Huang (2003) calibrate several classes of structural models to be consistent with the recent history of observed defaults. They find that different models could generate the wide range of credit spreads observed in the recent past, and further they provide some evidence about the predictive power of such models.
Theoretical determinants of domestic debt spreads.
Structural models of domestic debt have identified variables that affect debt spreads. In a manner consistent with the previous section, I put together three lists of variables that should capture most of the debt spread variation. As with the sovereign case, the first list also contains bond-specific variables, i.e., variables that vary within bond issues, e.g. years to maturity. The second list contains variables that vary from firm to firm but are the same for all bonds issued by firm (firm-specific variables). The third list contains variables that are the same for all bonds in the domestic sample, and try to capture changes in the U.S. interest rate term structure as well as changes in the U.S. economic climate.
Bond-specific variables.
The bond-specific variable is years to maturity. The same arguments from section 2.2.1 apply here.
Firm-specific variables.
I choose two firm-specific variables following the basic spirit of Merton's model as presented in Stulz (2003) . The first variable, leverage, has been used in previous research as a successful proxy of a firm's financial health. The second variable is the volatility of a firm's equity. A priori I expect a negative relation between each of these two variables and debt spreads, since an increase on any of them would make default more likely.
U.S. interest rate term structure.
The domestic sample is denominated in U.S. dollars. Therefore, I care about factors that affect the U.S. yield curve term structure. Similar to the sovereign case, I use the U.S. yield curve level and slope as explanatory factors of the term structure (Litterman and Scheinkman, 1991) . The arguments used in section 2.2.3 also apply here.
Since I collect data only on bonds issued by U.S. industrial firms, I assume their exposure to the economic cycle is better captured by the S&P 500 index and therefore I collect monthly returns for this index. Table 4 presents the predicted relations between the variables previously mentioned and debt spreads.
Data description.
The domestic sample contains all U.S. denominated bonds issued by industrial The results from these regressions can be seen on Table 6 . I estimated equation
(2) for each leverage group and for the overall sample. Clearly, the model performs better in the highly leveraged group. This is consistent with previous studies which find that structural models perform better for longer maturity, lower rated sub-groups. As with the sovereign case, I will only go over the overall sample results. There is nothing conclusive on the coefficient of changes in years to maturity. The negative but insignificant coefficient is consistent with previous results of Helwege and Turner (1999) 
4.
Analyzing the common factor.
It was mentioned in the introduction that the goal of this paper is to investigate whether the common factor identified in domestic credit spread changes is also present in sovereign debt spread changes. In this section, I establish the existence of a common factor in both the residuals from the regressions on sovereign and domestic debt spread changes.
Establishing the existence of common factors.
In order to investigate whether common factors are present in the unexplained variation in spreads, I use principal components analysis. This is a statistical technique for data reduction whose objective is to find unit-length linear combinations of the original variables that capture the maximum variance. I apply principal component analysis to the residuals obtained from the regressions discussed in previous sections to verify whether the unexplained variation is truly noise or whether there is evidence of a common factor driving this unexplained portion of the variance of credit spread changes.
The first problem faced when applying principal components analysis is how to organize unbalanced panels in the most efficient form. Research in this area conducted by Boivin and Ng (2003) shows that more data is not always better when conducting this type of factor analysis. In fact, in their forecast exercise they show that factors extracted There is weak evidence on the existence of a second component which explains an additional 8.53% of the variance. The existence of a first common factor that explains such a large portion of the variance is consistent with previous research, e.g., CollinDufresne et. al. (2001) . The existence of a second common factor has not been documented for domestic debt before, but this could be due to the fact that I am using a larger dataset and that I am looking at a longer time period that earlier studies.
Finally, panel C has the results of looking at the common components of both groups of bonds, sovereign and domestic. Interestingly, I find no evidence suggestive of the existence of a common factor to both groups of bonds. The first common factor explains 42.06% of the residual variance of spread changes, while the second factor explains an additional 33.12%. As mentioned before, Scherer and Avellaneda (2000) consider a value of 65% for the first common component as the lower boundary for a weak coupling, or correlation, between spread changes. The result I obtain is puzzling because if the market for dollar-denominated credit-risky bonds is integrated, and if the common components I find can be explained by liquidity shocks, then such shocks should be pervasive across markets (Chen, Lesmond, and Wei, 2002; Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam, 2003; Kamara, 1994) . According to panel C, this is not what is happening.
In order to shed more light on the issue of whether the common factor identified in both samples is indeed the same in both groups, I extract the first and second common components of each sample to compare them. These common factors are plotted in graph 1. The pattern seems to suggest a lead-lag relation between the first factor from the domestic sample and the first factor extracted from the sovereign sample. Graph 2 shows the second common component extracted from both samples. The figure seems to suggest a weak contemporaneous relation. These issues will be investigated further in the next sections.
Explanatory power of the extracted components.
Once I extract the two common factors out of each type of debt, I proceed to check whether they have explanatory power over the cross-section of debt spreads for the other type of debt. I estimate again equations (1) and (2) including in each equation the two common components extracted from the other group, i.e., I include the factors extracted from the sovereign sample into the domestic sample regression and vice versa.
Results are shown on table 9. First, I will talk about the sovereign regression when the domestic common components are included. Looking at rating categories, the explanatory power of the equation for the lower rated group (B-to C) increases, as measured from the R-squared statistic which went up from 22% to 31%. This sub-sample is the one with the least number of observations. There is, however, no gain in 
Looking into the information content of the common factors.
The principal component analysis conducted neither provides information on the dynamics of the factors identified nor provides an economic interpretation of them. In this section I investigate the contemporaneous and inter-temporal relation between factors and also investigate whether these factors might be capturing liquidity and/or supply/demand shocks.
Lead-lag relations.
The picture shown in graph 1 suggests the possibility of an intertemporal relation between the first factor extracted from the sovereign sample and the first factor extracted from the domestic sample. Using a vector-autoregression approach, I investigate the possibility of one of these markets acting as an early signal for potential problems that can affect the bond market in general. Previous work like Joutz and Maxwell (2002) Table 10 shows the results for the simple case when k is equal to two. Both the Akaike Information and Schwartz criteria suggest that a VAR system of two lags is warranted by the data. I first run the VAR model without exogenous variables to have an initial idea of the lead-lag structure. For brevity, I only report the R-squared value for each equation and also because the basic lead-lag relation is unchanged when the exogenous variables are included. I then run the VAR model with exogenous variables.
These exogenous variables are chosen to capture liquidity and supply/demand effects.
Most previous studies dealing with credit spreads specifically abstain from liquidity effects because of the lack of consensus on how to measure and model liquidity premium affecting spreads (Chen, Lesmond and Wei, 2003) . Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2003) study the consistency of the price of credit risk between the bond and derivatives markets. They find that the implied cost of credit is higher in the bond market than in the credit derivative market, and advance a possible explanation for this based on the existence of a liquidity component in debt spreads. Their measure for this liquidity premium is the difference between the price of credit risk in the bond and credit derivative markets.
17 Since all the bonds in the sample are denominated in U.S. dollars and they all trade in U.S. financial markets, I am interested in variables that measure the overall liquidity in these markets. I use two very general measures of liquidity. First, the difference in yield between the on-the-run 18 thirty year U.S. Treasury bond and the most recent off-the-run bond is computed. Off-the-run bonds are bonds that whilst not being the most recently issued in a certain maturity range, are very similar to the on-the-run issue in all respects. Therefore, any differences in prices -and therefore in yields-is usually considered to be due to liquidity. As liquidity dries up, this difference is expected to decrease. decrease of credit constraints. Harvey and Huang (2002) Table 10 has the results of running the VAR model with the exogenous variables.
It seems that the sovereign factors have explanatory power over the domestic factors but not the other way around. I will discuss each one of the four equations in the VAR model, starting with the first common domestic factor. The second lag of the first sovereign factor is significant in the regression for the first domestic factor. The flows to stocks and flows to funds variables are negative and significant. This equation is the one with the smallest gain in R-squared when including the exogenous variables.
The first sovereign factor seems to be slightly autoregressive from the barely significant coefficient for its own first lag. Coefficients for the domestic factor lags are not significant, while all the coefficients for the exogenous variables are highly significant. It seems as if this factor is capturing both liquidity and demand shocks as implied by the coefficients associated with the exogenous variables. This equation also has the highest increase in explanatory power, since the R-squared increased from 0.05 to 0.37 when the exogenous variables are added to the specification.
The second domestic factor equation shows significant coefficients for the first lag of both sovereign factors as well as for its own second lag. The flow variables come out both significant, as well the net reserves coefficient.
The second sovereign factor equation has the highest R-squared value, at 0.67.
Second lag coefficients for both sovereign factors are significant, as are both lags of the second domestic factor. The flow variables and the net reserves measure are also highly significant.
The picture that emerges from this vector auto-regression model is the following.
The exogenous variables do capture a significant portion of the time variation of the factors extracted from the sovereign and the domestic sample. It seems also that there is evidence supporting the previous finding where the sovereign common components are related to domestic spread changes but not the other way around, since the lags of the sovereign common components have significant coefficients in the equations for the domestic common components but the domestic common components do not appear to have explanatory power in the equations for sovereign common factors.
Also, there is evidence of an inter-temporal relation going from the first sovereign common component to the first domestic common component. This is expected from graph 1. I find that all four common factors are related to the flows of money going into equity and bond funds, as measured by the Investment Company Institute (ICI), while only the second common component of each group is related to a macroeconomic measure of liquidity, namely the net borrowed reserves form the Federal Reserve. These results are consistent with previous literature that has concluded that the unexplained variation in credit spreads could be caused by liquidity and supply/demand shocks.
Conclusions and future work
The availability in recent years of a panel of observations on sovereign bond yields provides with a unique instrument whose dynamics can shed some light in the study of the determinants of debt for countries and firms. In this paper I identified the existence of a two strong common components, unrelated to credit risk and distinct for each type of debt, in credit spreads of sovereign and domestic bonds. Using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model, I find that domestic spreads are related to the lagged first common component of sovereign spreads. While there is no contemporaneous common component in bond spreads, there seems to be a common component when focusing on the dynamics of these spreads. Traditional macro liquidity variables are related to the common components found in domestic and sovereign spread changes.
I will conduct further research to shed light on why the relation between domestic corporate credit spreads and sovereign credit spreads is not contemporaneous, as expected in a fully integrated market. This could be due to differences in liquidity and infrequent trading or maybe it reflects a market inefficiency. My results are also surprising since they suggest that the cost of debt for emerging markets depends mostly on country and emerging-market specific considerations, and this is surprising when considering results obtained by previous literature emphasizing the impact of developed country developments for capital flows into emerging markets.
In this paper, I contributed to the literature by showing that current structural models of debt spreads can be improved if these findings are incorporated in them. To the extent that investors depend on these models to hedge the credit risk of their bond positions, they can benefit from a better understanding of the determinants of credit spreads changes. My research also shows that, after taking into account the dynamics of the common components in credit spreads across debt types, the cost of debt for firms and countries depends to some extent on shocks that affect all types of debt. 
Variables Expected sign Rationale
Life to maturity Uncertain Stulz (2003) explains how the relation between time to maturity and credit spreads depends on the relative size of debt and firm value. Helwege and Turner (1999) establish that due to survivorship bias only relatively better rated countries issue longer-term debt. Also, investors might perceive shorterterm sovereign bonds as having higher probability of default and therefore higher expected losses. This belief is reinforced by the fact that some countries' debt do not incorporate cross-default clauses, making easier for countries facing financial distress default first on issues with closer maturities. Longer-term bonds are, in this setting, perceived as safer since countries could have time to implement reforms that bring them out of financial distress.
Debt to foreign reserves ratio and Debt to exports ratio Positive A higher ratio of any of these two measures implies a smaller distance-todefault. So, larger values of them should be associated with higher spreads.
Country risk measure
Positive This measure has a higher value for countries that are perceived to have higher political risks, for instance, higher expropriation risk. The larger the value of this variable, the higher the debt spread.
Local stock market volatility

Positive
This variable is an imperfect proxy of a country's wealth volatility. Still, we expect a positive relation since more volatility makes default more likely.
U.S. Treasury yield curve level Negative
Assuming that the country's wealth follows a risk-neutral drift, higher rates should be associated with higher drifts which in turn should reduce debt spreads. Also, Stulz (2003) shows how debt value decreases with maturity. This reduced the probability of default, and ergo, spreads.
U.S. Treasury yield curve slope Negative
We assume a positive slope to signal higher future interest rates. The previous arguments then suggest a negative relation between spreads and the interest rate slope. Local stock market return Negative A local stock index return is included as a proxy of the economic climate or business cycle. On average, we would expect smaller spreads when the economy as a whole is doing well. The sample includes all non-callable, non-puttable sovereign bonds in U.S. dollars that traded between Janury 1990 and January 2003. All data is from Datastream. The spread over U.S. Treasuries is computed as the difference between the redemption yield of the sovereign bond and the value of a linear interpolation of the U.S. Treasury yield curve to obtain the yield of a U.S. instrument with identical maturity. Debt/Reserves is computed using all outstanding foreign debt (bank loans, Brady bonds and Eurobonds) divided by the total number of international reserves in current U.S. dollars. Political risk is the value of The Economist Intelligence Unit's country index. Local stock market volatility is the stardard volatility computed each month from daily stock market returns in U.S. dollars. The U.S. Treasury yield level is the yield of the 10 year U.S. Treasury note. The U.S. Treasury slope is computed as the difference between the yield of the 10 year and the 2 year U.S. Treasury notes. The world stock return is the log return of Datastream's world total return index. 
Variables Expected sign Rationale
Leverage and Equity return volatility
Positive A higher leverage ratio increases the probability of a firm facing financial distress. This should increase spreads. Also, from a contingent claims approach, equity return volatility can proxy for firm's value volatility. A higher volatility increases the chane of the firm's value process to cross the threshold at which a firm defaults on its debt. U.S. Treasury yield curve level
Negative
Assuming that the firm's value follows a risk-neutral drift, higher rates should be associated with higher drifts which in turn should reduce debt spreads. Also, Stulz (2003) shows how debt value decreases with maturity. This reduced the probability of default, and ergo, spreads. U.S. Treasury yield curve slope
We assume a positive slope to signal higher future interest rates. The previous arguments then suggest a negative relation between spreads and the interest rate slope. S&P 500 return Negative As the economic environment improves, measured by the S&P return, we expect firms to do better and therefore to reduce the probability of defaulting on their debt. The sample includes all non-callable, non-puttable domestic bonds issued by industrial firms in U.S. dollars that traded between Janury 1990 and January 2003. All data is from Datastream. The spread over U.S. Treasuries is computed as the difference between the redemption yield of the sovereign bond and the value of a linear interpolation of the U.S. Treasury yield curve to obtain the yield of a U.S. instrument with identical maturity. Leverage is computed as the ratio of book value of debt divided by the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity. Stock market volatility is computed monthly from daily stock market log returns. The U.S. Treasury yield level is the yield of the 10 year U.S. Treasury note. The U.S. Treasury slope is computed as the difference between the yield of the 10 year and the 2 year U.S. Treasury notes. d11  d12  d13  d21  d22  d23  d31  d32  d33  s11  s12  s13  s21  s22  s23  s31  s32  s33 This table presents the correlation structure of the residual bins. Each sample (sovereign and domestic) was divided in three maturity categories and three leverage (debt to reserves, in the sovereign case) categories. Each observation was assigned to a category. To compute the residuals, regressions were conducted in each bin. Then, for each bin, we average across residuals. The bins are named dij and sij for i, j=1, 2, 3, where d stands for domestic and s stands for sovereign, i for maturity category (1 = shot-term, 2 = medium-term, 3 = long-term), and j stand for leverage (debt to reserves) category (1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high). For example, d23 refers to a domestic, medium-term, high-leverage bin. The first and second domestic factors are the factors extracted from the princpical component analysis of the residuals of equation (2) applied to the domestic bins. The first and second sovereign factors are extracted from the principal component analysis of the residuals of equation (1) applied to the sovreign bins. Net borrowed reserves is computed as total borrowing minus extended credit minus excess reserves, divided by total reserves.Onoff is the difference between the on-the-run thirty year U.S. Treasury bond and the most recent off-the-run bond. Flowsstocks is from the IFC's statistics and is the amount of money flowing into equity mutual funds. Flowbonds is from the same source and represents the flows into bond funds; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%; 5%; and 1% level respectively. 
